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MISSION TO ASSESS FUTURE SUSTAINABLE OPTIONS OF THE LAO
UXO TRUST FUND AND THE UXO LAO MINE ACTION PROGRAMME:
MISSION REPORT
1.

Executive Summary

This mission was intended to focus on ways to allow the mine action program
in Lao PDR to be maintained on a sustainable basis. As a result, comment on
many of the things that are successful about the program is restricted. It is
therefore worth mentioning briefly here that the program has been notably
successful in developing the technical capacity to deal with UXO
contamination.
The early sections of the report set out the terms of reference for the mission,
a summary of the background to the current situation and the major issues
now facing the program. The major reported concerns amongst stakeholders1
are:
•

A problem in communication and coordination at all levels

•

A perceived lack of transparency, exacerbated by the communication
problems

•

The lack of a strategic plan, with subsequent difficulties in comparing
inputs with outputs and determining a suitable exit strategy for donor
assistance

• Lack of Government of Lao contribution to the program, both in terms of

cash support and inclusion of the UXO issue in the general development
process and documentation

•

Difficulties for donors to support the current vertically and horizontally
integrated structure of UXO Lao, especially in terms of paying staff
salaries when the staff are, in effect, Lao civil servants

This report sets out some ideas for scoping the contamination problem in Lao
PDR and suggests ways by which priority areas could be identified. This leads
to means by which long, medium and short-term strategic action plans could
be developed and an exit strategy for international assistance established. A
10-year intensive plan with international support is suggested, with the
Government of Lao taking on full responsibility for maintaining the UXO
response capacity that will be needed to deal with the residual contamination.
There are also a number of suggestions for improving cost effectiveness and
developing the role of UNDP in supporting the program.
The report then identifies two options for restructuring the UXO program that
address stakeholder concerns. Both, however, would require the separation of
the coordination, planning and regulatory functions from those of

1

There are a number of other concerns, which are set out in the body of the report.
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implementation, not least to allow higher-level managers to focus on strategic
issues rather than being bogged down in the logistic detail for implementation.
Finally, the report sets out a number of suggestions for improving resource
mobilisation.
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MISSION TO ASSESS FUTURE SUSTAINABLE OPTIONS OF THE LAO
UXO TRUST FUND AND THE UXO LAO MINE ACTION PROGRAMME:
MISSION REPORT
2.

Introduction, aim and methodology

2.1.

Introduction

Lao PDR is one of the world's most heavily UXO contaminated nations.
During the Indo-China war, there was extensive aerial bombardment and
ground battles. During the period 1964 – 73, more than 500,000 bombing
missions were launched, dropping more than 2 million tons of ordnance. The
bombing was concentrated in the northern and southeastern provinces of the
country.
With support from the international community a national programme, UXO
LAO, was established in 1995/96. By Prime Ministerial Decree dated 13
February 1996, a Steering Committee, supervised by the Minister and under
the Chairmanship of the Vice Minister for Labour and Social Welfare, was
established and charged with responsibility for overall policy on UXO and
mine action. Under the same decree, UXO LAO was established as a public
institution with legal individual responsibility supervised by the Steering
Committee. The UXO LAO program is nationally executed. Operational
activities occur in nine of the most heavily contaminated and impacted
provinces, covering mine risk reduction education, survey, clearance and
training. Until recently, UXO LAO employed 1,100 staff, making it one of the
country’s largest employers.
The UXO LAO program is currently in a financial crisis and although field operations
are progressing well, the program, as of mid July 2002 has had to reduce the numbers
of teams working in the field. As a result of this crisis, UNDP and UXO LAO
undertook to engage an independent assessment mission to clarify the problem and
provide some insight into possible solutions.

2.2.

Aim

This assessment mission was tasked with finding a new funding model for UXO LAO
to operate at optimum and sustainable levels.

2.3.

Methodology

The UNDP Country Office assembled a 4–person team to carry out this Mission. The
team leader was selected based on extensive experience with humanitarian mine

1
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action programs, with one other expatriate selected for a broad width of experience
with a number of public and private sector institutions. However, the team was also
given a strong Lao national component, with one member provided by UXO LAO and
another provided by the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare. The two Lao
nationals played a vital part in providing the background to the current situation and
guidance on the structure and working practices of programs in Lao PDR and of the
Government of Lao. The mission could not have operated without their important
contributions.
The team was given 3 weeks to complete the mission. Once the team was assembled
in Vientiane, an outline works plan for the mission was drawn up in consultation with
UNDP. This broke down activity into the following steps:

•

Information gathering, including2
o Briefings from UXO LAO staff and technical advisors on the organisation
and structure of the UXO LAO program
o Extensive stakeholder consultation drawing on interviews with relevant
donor, international organisation and NGO representatives
o Meetings with relevant government officials
o Document review and analysis
o Field trips3

•

Analysis of the compiled information

•

Preparation of briefing material on initial findings, which provided a means to get
some initial feedback on the final days of the mission.

The process was intense, given the intent of the team to make the process as
inclusive as possible and the short timeframe of the mission. Not everyone
that the team hoped to speak to was available (for example, not all donors
had representatives in country at the time of the mission), but it is believed
that sufficient input was gained to paint an accurate picture of the situation.
Whatever success has been achieved is due in a very great extent to the
assistance provided by all of the agencies that the team dealt with. Everyone
2

A summary of meetings is included at Annex A, with a key document list at Annex B.
The team was required by the Terms of Reference (compiled by UNDP) to undertake at least one field
trip. In fact, thanks to the extensive cooperation of UXO LAO staff, the team was able to visit two field
locations, in Xieng Khouang and Khammoune.

3
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was very helpful in setting up appointments at short notice and without the
administrative support from the staff of the UXO LAO and UNDP offices the
team’s work would have been much harder.
Annexes (not available):
A. Summary of meetings
B. Key document list

3
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Background and institutional analysis

3.1.

UXO Contamination in Lao PDR

Lao PDR is one of the world's most heavily UXO contaminated nations. During the IndoChina war period, there was extensive aerial bombardment and ground battles. Briefing
material prepared by UXO LAO states that, during the period 1964 – 73, more than
500,000 bombing missions were launched against targets in Laotian territory, dropping
more than 2 million tons of ordnance. The bombing was concentrated in the northern and
south-eastern provinces of the country.
As a consequence of this bombing, two-thirds of the country suffers from UXO. Ten of the
eighteen provinces are considered severely contaminated.4 The Handicap International (HI)
survey conducted in 1997 found that fifteen of the country’s eighteen provinces were
affected to one degree or another. HI found that in 42 of the districts surveyed, more than
35% of the villages reported UXO contamination. These 42 districts the survey considered
to be ‘severely’ contaminated. Only provinces in the north central part of the country and
in the west central part of the country, bordering on Myanmar, Thailand and China are
relatively uncontaminated or not contaminated at all. HI also ranked ten of the country’s
eighteen provinces as severely contaminated, three provinces as not reporting a significant
problem at all, and the remaining five provinces reporting significant contamination.
The HI survey found that 2,861 villages of 7,675 villages visited reported the continued
presence of UXO. Of these villages, 948 reported that UXO lay in the centre of the village,
posing a threat to the local people and their children. In 375 villages, UXO were reported
along roads or paths, affecting travel, commerce and access to water, firewood, fodder and
fields. 1700 villages reported UXO in their fields; these UXO pose risks to the farmers and
reduce the chances of prosperity.
From analysis of bombing mission records and surveys, it is estimated [by UXO LAO] that
approximately 87,213 square kilometres of land are considered to have a risk of containing
UXO. (12,427 sq. km. high risk, 74,786 sq. km. moderate risk). Through necessity, many
communities have to live with UXO, which pose both an ongoing humanitarian and
development challenge.
Most of the aerial bombardment consisted of anti-personnel cluster bombs filled
with sub-munitions. These…were intended to explode on, or shortly after impact.
Each cluster bomb container was filled with up to 670 individual bomblets, each
about the size of a tennis ball. Known as "bombies" in Lao language, on
detonation, each one can kill and injure people in the vicinity. Extensive ground
battles also left a large amount of unexploded ordnance including artillery and
mortar shells, mines, rockets, grenades, and other devices from various countries

4

Deadly Harvest: Unexploded Ordnance in Laos, a publication of UXO LAO.
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of origin. It is estimated [by UXO LAO] that up to 30% of bombies and other
munitions failed to explode and continue to lie active in the ground5.

According to the HI survey:
“This type of UXO [bombies] was found in 1,553 villages. Large
bombs, varying from 100 kilograms up to 1,000 kilograms were
recorded as being present in 1,156 villages. Mortar shells were
reported in 782 villages. Projectiles from artillery and armoured
vehicles were reported in 555 villages.6”
The HI survey also accumulated data on nearly 10,649 UXO related
incidents in Lao PDR since 1973. In 1997 the incidents were occurring
at a rate of 200 a year. This was a dramatic reduction in the number of
accidents per year from a reported high of 1400 per year (about 116
per month on average). UXO LAO briefing notes say that, from the end
of the war until the mid 1990s, an estimated 240 persons per year
were victims of UXO and mines. Since that time the number has
dropped to approximately 100-150 per year but there is apparently
there is some doubt about the accuracy of reporting.
The HI survey reported that one quarter of total reported incidents involved
children, and that the proportion of children involved had increased over time. The
survey also noted that though accidents were occurring during agricultural
activities or economic activities in the surrounding forests, some villagers
tampering with the pieces of UXO in order to extract the explosives or to sell the
scrap metal often cause the items to explode.
UXO injuries in Lao PDR can be compared to injuries sustained in minecontaminated countries. Injuries due to mines are often likely to be sustained in
the lower body, often involving the amputation of the foot or the foot and part of the
leg. Injuries to the upper body are very rare, and are most likely to occur if the
mine is being tampered with. If medical care is available fairly quickly, mine victims
are not so likely to die, unless they are very young children, or very old. In
contrast, injuries from the “bombies”, or the anti-personnel bomblets dropped by
the Americans during the Indo-China war are much more likely to kill the person
involved in the incident. Further, the injuries are much more likely to be to the
upper body than to the legs. The reason for this, according to Hi is that:
“These devices were designed to kill. More than half of the victims die
almost immediately following the accident. If the victim survives, the
5

Note: there are a variety of figures in use in the mine action sector to estimate the percentage of
items of ammunition that fail to function as intended (i.e. that become UXO). Whatever the actual
percentage actually is, it is certainly true to say that a significant percentage of explosive ordnance
fails to function. In many respects it does not matter how many items of UXO contaminate an area,
if the threat of contamination is enough to prevent people from using the ground through fear of
death or injury.
6
Living with UXO, op cit, page 7.
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explosion often causes severe wounding and trauma, especially to the
upper half of the body. Over half of the amputations resulting from injuries
caused by UXO involve amputation of the hand, lower and upper arm. This
concentration of wounding is due to the position and activity of the victim at
the time of the accident. Most people are injured while defusing or handling
UXO, playing with UXO or weeding in agricultural fields.”7
The HI survey noted that the widespread distribution of UXO was an impediment
to development, and suggested that as population increased there would be
increased pressure on land, and it “will be difficult for development in affected
areas and certain sectors of the Lao economy to achieve their full potential.”8 The
surveyors were unable to place an economic cost on the contamination.
According to UNDP:
“In rural communities, high levels of poverty are often linked to high levels
of UXO contamination. The widespread presence of UXO prevents the
majority of the country’s farmers from making full use of existing cultivated
land and limits expansion of new agricultural activities. Given the country's
rapid population growth of 3.4 per cent per year, UXO contamination both
acts as a major constraint to development and contributes to endemic
poverty by limiting expansion of agricultural production. Low population
density (lowest in Asia) means that in some areas, communities can choose
to leave contaminated land alone. However, population growth (highest in
Asia) is placing pressure on unused (contaminated) land changing the
national accident profile and the impact on development.9”
3.2.

The Establishment of UXO LAO

UXO LAO was established in 1996 by the decree of the Prime Minister. The years
1996 and 1997 are considered by UXO LAO to have been emergency start-up
years, and 1998 was the year in which full expansion was achieved and the
program began to consolidate the gains that it had achieved. According the UXO
LAO 1998 Annual Report:
“UXO LAO commenced the year with full operations being carried out in four
provinces. By the end of the year operations had been firmly established and effective in
eight provinces with preparations well underway for full range of operational activities
in the ninth province of Khammouane”.
This meant that of the ten most contaminated provinces in Lao PDR, UXO LAO
was operating in nine. By the end of 1998, UXO LAO could report that it had
accomplished 1,392 village visits, cleared 292 hectares, destroyed 62,875 pieces
of UXO, conducted 556 village visits for community awareness, and briefed

7

Living with UXO, op cit, page 8.
Living with UXO, op cit, page 10.
9
Extracted from background material included by UNDP in the terms of reference for this mission.
8
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161,456 persons.10 In 1998, UXO LAO employed over 900 deminers, surveyors,
community awareness staff and trainers.
The objectives of UXO LAO are to:
•

Reduce the number of civilian UXO casualties (deaths and injuries).

•

Increase the amount of land available for food production and other
development activities11.

The UXO LAO programme is nationally executed. Operational activities occur in
nine of the most heavily contaminated and impacted provinces, covering mine risk
reduction education, survey, clearance and training. Until recently, UXO LAO
employed 1,100 staff, making it one of the country’s largest employers.
UXO LAO is responsible for most of the humanitarian12 mine action in Laos, and is
active in 9 of the 15 affected provinces. Elements of UXO LAO are funded through
a UNDP - managed Trust Fund, with other contribution being provided bilaterally
(i.e. not through UNDP). In some provinces, the work is carried out with the
assistance of the international organisations (NGO and commercial) that act as
'implementing partners':
•
•
•
•
•
•

Mines Advisory Group (UK)
Handicap International (Belgium)
Belgian Army
Gerbera (Germany)
Norwegian People’s Aid
UNICEF (community awareness programme)

The implementing partners have transferred national staff and have handed over
equipment and vehicles to UXO LAO and are expected to withdraw completely
over the next few years (although there is as yet no strategic plan for such a
withdrawal).
Until earlier this year, UXO LAO deployed 24 demining groups, each consisting of
52 people and each Group being able to divide into different sized teams able to
work on three sites simultaneously. The teams carry out both area clearance tasks
(where the teams work to clear an entire site of contamination) and roving
clearance tasks (where the team responds to reports of isolated UXO being found
and clears them). The roving teams normally consist of a team leader, 4-5
deminers and a medic, whereas area clearance tasks can take up to all 35 people
in the group. UXO LAO is also deploying survey teams to follow up on the National
Survey carried out by Handicap International in 1997, and is actively involved in
community awareness programs implemented by UNICEF.
10

UXO LAO: 1998 Annual Report, Lao National UXO Programme.
UXO LAO: Laos National UXO Programme 1999 Work Plan, page 1.
12
The use of the word ‘humanitarian’ in this context can be confusing. In terms of UXO LAO activity
‘humanitarian’ does not include most development sectors and is used to describe ‘emergency’
clearance of reported UXO and area clearance of agricultural land that is not covered out on a
cost-recovery basis. The question of how to define ‘humanitarian’ UXO clearance will be addressed
in more depth in later sections of this report.
11
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UNDP and the UXO LAO Trust Fund

UNDP agreed a Project Document with the government of Lao PDR in November
1995, giving them a role to assist in the clearance of UXO through the
establishment and operation of a trust fund for mine action activities in Lao PDR.
Although often referred to as the “UXO LAO Trust Fund” an exact interpretation of
the documentation makes it clear that the trust fund could be used to support mine
action activities by any approved actors, and its mandate covers community
awareness (called ‘Mine Risk Education’ in other country programs) and victim
assistance. UNDP have also assisted in the provision of some technical advisors
to UXO LAO.
3.4.

The National Steering Committee

The establishment of the Lao UXO Trust Fund was mirrored by the establishment
of a National Steering Committee to provide Lao PDR government oversight of the
national UXO program. The Minister of Labour and Social Welfare is the Chair of
the National Steering Committee. Initially, UXO LAO also acted as a secretariat to
this committee until 2000, when a new Prime Ministerial Decree relieved the
National Director of UXO LAO from his duties as Secretary of the National
Steering Committee and gave this duty to a new National Steering Committee
Office (NSCO). The decree also gives NSCO responsibility for a wide number of
tasks, including coordination and development of fund raising strategies; however
the NSCO is not yet fully effective in such a role, not least as a result of a lack of
any external funding or technical assistance.
3.5.

Resource mobilisation

There is no doubt that UXO LAO has implemented its program of training and
clearance activities with remarkable success. A review of the organisation’s
Annual Reports for the years 1996 to 2001 demonstrate its achievements.
In 1996, the organisation’s corporate structure was established as an autonomous
financial agency, office facilities and a Steering Committee were set up, a training
centre was established, community awareness activities began, a survey of
affected provinces was undertaken, and clearance teams began work in four
provinces.
The following year five additional target provinces were included in the program,
additional staff were recruited and training continued. Resource mobilisation
activities were also successful and UXO clearance was raised at the
Government/UNDP Round Table Meeting for donors.
Between 1998 and 2000 the program of clearance, awareness and training was
extended and economic modelling was undertaken to assess the productive value
of cleared land. Most of the targets identified in annual work plans were met,
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although problems were noted in recruiting or training maintenance staff and in
resource mobilisation.
A number of operations were streamlined in 2000 including centralisation of
purchasing and staffing, and changes were made to the National Steering
Committee. The financial basis of UXO activities in Lao received relatively little
attention in the early years of operation. One of the benefits of using a Trust Fund
is that funds can be carried over from one financial year into the next. By contrast,
many donors are obliged to return unused funds to their respective government or
agency at the end of each financial year and some donors contributed unused
humanitarian or emergency funds to the Trust Fund as their financial year closed.
The following table summarises income, expenditure and carryover for the period
1996 to 2001. Limitations of the data are that separate figures for 1996 and 1997
are not available and that one major contribution expected in 1998 was not
received until the following financial year.
Table 3.1: Selected financial information on Trust Fund operations13
Ser

Description
1996-1997

1998

Year
1999

2000

2001

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(a)

(b)

1

2,395,104

1,314,071

1,111,647

1,389,405

1,381,405

2

Subtotal unearmarked
Subtotal earmarked

1,972,357

1,326,361

3,389,869

74,309

1,355,930

3
4

Total income
National staff

6,487,461

2,640,432
218,797

4,625,901
856,349

2,076,807
1,376,279

3,373,131
1,631,180

5

International staff

296,134

267,164

347,426

398,100

6

Other

2,524,582

4,210,000

1,589,513

1,875,176

2,060,067

7

Total expenditure

2529060

4720898

2713799

3598881

4089348

8

Total Carryover

3958401

1877935

3790037

2267963

1551746

The key feature of the table is that contributions, especially for un-earmarked
activities have gradually fallen. By contrast, costs, especially for national salaries
have risen steadily over the period. By the end of the period much of the
carryover funding was earmarked to projects and was not available for other
activities, especially staff salaries. Further financial information is at Annexes A-D.
UXO LAO Annual Reports also record in kind contributions in excess of $5m each
year since 1998. This includes additional support for training, equipment, vehicles
and materials, as well as bilateral agreements with implementing partners. These
contributions are not placed directly into the Trust Fund, however, up to $10m per
year might be attributed to mine action in Lao PDR. This estimate does not
include the activities of private companies that undertake commercial demining for
infrastructure and other investment14.
13

Provided by UXO LAO
The low emphasis made on non Trust Fund contributions is understandable in that these
contributions are outside the scope of the Trust Fund, but make it harder for contributors to
measure all inputs against outputs. It would certainly help if the total contributions were made
14
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The initial UNDP contributions of over $2 million set a strong financial basis for
activities, and work commenced quickly to establish a training facility and field
operations.
In 1996 resource mobilisation efforts were successful in raising the necessary
funds for operations. Efforts to secure funding in the longer term were rewarded
by a number of donors.
In 1997 and 1998 UNDP remained the focal point for resource mobilisation
activities. Contributions to the work of UXO LAO were received through the Trust
Fund, bilateral contributions, contributions paid directly to implementing partner
organisation and private donations. In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
assisted in liaison with donor countries and organisations.
In 1999 initial UNDP start-up funds were fully expended. Concern was raised that,
while direct funding from donors for international staff continued, funding for
national staff (deminers, trainers, surveyors, etc) and programme running costs
was reducing. UXO LAO’s forward estimates revealed a gap in future funding from
2000 onwards.
This concern was realised the following year when UXO LAO assumed
responsibility for national salaries and operating costs. National personnel
previously employed by implementing partners NGOs were gradually transferred
to UXO LAO contracts and assets were handed over.
The UXO LAO Annual Report for 2001 reported:
“Securing the necessary funds to make UXO LAO’s humanitarian and development
work viable continued to be a difficult task in 2001. As a result of the increased
expenditure in UXO LAO’s financial responsibilities for national salaries and operating
costs, and a decrease in donor support to the programme, UXO LAO was only just able
to continue full operations in 2001. The increased expenditure of UXO LAO was a
direct result of national personnel previously employed and funded by our
implementing partners being transferred to UXO LAO contracts as well as some assets
and the costs associated with those assets being handed over to the national body (UXO
LAO). While implementing partner and direct donor funding to the partners was
reduced, as a result of the hand over, a similar increase in contributions to UXO LAO
did not occur.
clearer. The recommendations for structural changes discussed later in this report would help
rectify this situation.
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…In previous years UXO LAO has been able to carry over substantial funds
from year to year to be able to provide new funding while the programme
continued at full operations”.
Several attempts were made to address this issue as it unfolded. An External
Evaluation Mission15 conducted in 1998 to consider the difficulties to be addressed
in moving from the establishment to consolidation phase of the project. Issues
identified in the report were presented in four key areas: the need for strategic as
well as operational planning, capacity building, the importance of efficient
procurement and management and the need to strengthen resource mobilisation
efforts.
In 2000, the USA funded a study into sustainable funding mechanisms by BAHR16.
The report outlined four options and recommended that an interest-bearing fund
be established from donations and grants with a 20-year life to provide $5 million
per year. There are a number of practical implications of this approach and, to
date, no attempt has been made to implement the option.
In spite of these efforts resource mobilisation for UXO LAO was not adequate and
the organisation proved to be financially unsustainable. In 2002 UXO LAO
employed 1,130 staff but by the end of July the number had been cut to 623. Many
reasons have been given for this including donor fatigue, competition for
humanitarian assistance from widely reported activity in other countries such as
Afghanistan, a level of complacency as UXO LAO focussed on operational issues
rather than funding and a lack of planning. There is also no doubt that the
decision to transfer Lao national staff to UXO LAO, rather than continuing their
employment directly through NGOs, was a significant factor. This issue is
discussed in more detail later in this report.
There are a number of implications of this financial shortfall. Firstly, training and
equipment will be unused and the investment it represents could be lost. Many of
the people who have been retrenched are deminers who live in provinces where
there are few employment alternatives. In addition to the effect on provincial
economies, there is a risk that deminers may be tempted to use their skills to
harvest UXO for scrap metal, for the explosive they contain or to sell the casing as
souvenirs to tourists. A further complication is that life expectancy in Lao PDR is
54 years and people who witnessed the bombings and can assist with descriptions
of the activity are relatively old. Other staff, that have transferable skills, such as
translators, secretaries or drivers will take jobs in other organisations.
Annexes to Section 3:
A. UXO LAO Income, 1996-2001
B. UXO LAO Expenditure, 1996-2001
C. Balances Brought Forward, 1996-2001
D. Summary of Expenditure Breakdown for UXO LAO, 1996-2001
15

Van Ree, Taylor and Chanthavilay External Evaluation Mission Project Lao/95/012/C/07/99
Business of Adams, Hargett and Riley: Lao PDR Feasibility Study on Reimbursable UXO
Clearance

16
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4. The Issues
As stated at the beginning of this report, UXO LAO has made significant
progress in addressing the UXO problem in Lao PDR. By focussing on
financial sustainability, this report does not fully cover the many positive
achievements to date. It is recognised that a significant amount of capacity
building has been carried out and teams are clearing bombs throughout 9
provinces without incident on a daily basis.
A wide range of issues and concerns was raised with the evaluation team.
The main headings under which the issues could be grouped are as follows:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
4.1

Coordination
Planning
Gaps in the UXO Program
Regulatory and implementation roles of UXO LAO
Trust Fund Management and the role of UNDP
Transparency and accountability
Importance of the UXO issue within Government of Lao policy
Reluctance or inability of donors to provide funds for national salaries
Public Relations and Resource Mobilisation

Coordination

Many donors expressed concern about a perceived lack of coordination of
UXO activity in Lao PDR. In addition to UXO LAO, there are a number of
commercial projects and the Lao army who are involved in demining activity.
The early focus of UXO LAO was on training and demining and less attention
was given to the coordination role defined in its charter, although some high
quality coordination tools have been developed, such as the database.
There is also confusion about which agency leads UXO clearance activity in
Lao PDR. Some donors liase with UXO LAO but also note that the Steering
Committee Secretariat has approached donors directly. Many donors would
like to see more structured coordination without setting up a large
bureaucratic structure.
4.2

Planning

All donors expressed concern that the disposal of UXO in Lao PDR appears
to be an open ended activity and that there has been no real attempt to define
the level of resources needed to control or remove the problem. UXO LAO
produces annual reports giving figures for the numbers of hectares cleared,
number and types of UXO destroyed, number of villages visited by awareness
teams and the number of beneficiaries in each village. Donors recognise,
however, that these numbers only tell part of the story. No two sites are the
same and it is difficult to determine from the figures whether demining in Lao
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PDR is a cost effective exercise. Other issues also compete for development
assistance. One example often cited is that there are far more people killed in
road accidents in Lao than by UXO and some donors have reallocated
resources to improving roads and raising traffic safety awareness. This
approach overlooks the economic benefit of cleared land for food production
in a country where it is estimated that over half the population suffers from
episodic or chronic malnutrition. Although some work has been undertaken to
estimate the economic and social cost of contamination these benefits are not
widely reported.
Estimates of the time it might take to clear UXO in Lao have ranged up to
1300 years whereas donors carefully plan their activities for between one and
five years in advance. No donor is prepared to fund an open-ended
commitment.
The process of clearing UXO is time consuming and cannot be rushed,
however, it is not possible or necessary to clear every piece of UXO in the
country. The development of a strategic plan, identifying areas of land that
have economic potential, offers a direction forward.
Development assistance requires a structured approach. A strategic plan, with
estimates of the project’s scope including time and resources required to bring
the problem under control, and a framework of socio-economic milestones
and outputs, would provide a focal point for donor support.
Funding for development assistance is usually allocated after consideration of
priorities across all sectors and in consultation with the Lao Government.
Donors need several years of lead time to plan and are likely to support a
strategic plan that has been endorsed by the Government at the highest level.
The planning process could also justify increased external funding for a
clearly defined time period.
4.3

Gaps in the UXO program

A number of gaps in UXO activity were also raised that could be addressed in
a plan:
•

Some contaminated provinces still do not have demining projects.

•

The socio-economic benefits of demining have could be more clearly
identified and measured. There is an opportunity cost of unproductive
land and a high social and economic cost in supporting victims.

•

No single agency appears to be responsible for collating and disseminating information
on the number of UXO related accidents although some data is collected by Consortium
as part of its awareness campaign.
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•

Commercial deminers are not required to provide data on areas they have
cleared to update the national database.

•

Community awareness programs target some villagers and schools, but
no agency is directly targeting information towards people who defuse
bombs for scrap (usually adult males).

4.4

Regulatory and Implementation roles of UXO LAO

Demining activities in Lao PDR are self regulated and it is possible that
different standards are being used by agencies outside the UXO framework.
Most donors agree that the same standards should apply to all operations,
regardless of which agency undertook the work and whether the activity was
for humanitarian, development or commercial outcomes17.
One issue that was raised by stakeholders is that UXO LAO operations could
be more efficient and devote more time and resources to improved
coordination. For example, the current centralised decision making process
delays expenditure being approved, even where that expenditure is
specifically agreed and budgeted for within individual project MOU.
4.5

Trust Fund Management and the Role of UNDP

UNDP oversees use of the Trust Fund and some donors would like the
agency to take a stronger role in donor coordination.
Some concern was expressed that UNDP administrative processes and
contract requirements are slow, although the situation has improved in recent
years. The time taken for administrative processes has not met the financial
and reporting requirements of some donors.
The Trust Fund tracks funds as either earmarked or unearmarked
contributions. Earmarked funds are provided with an identified purpose
(normally as required by the donor) while unearmarked funds are used to
support other community awareness and demining activities. Some donors
have chosen to work bilaterally to gain more visibility for and to ensure closer
responsibility for a project. Bilateral agreements also allow donors to work
through NGOs registered in their own countries. Bilateral funding is not fully
reported in existing UXO LAO reporting documentation, which can make it
difficult to assess the full expenditure on UXO projects in Lao PDR. There is
no recording of development projects funded through the Asian Development
Bank, for example, even though this is a significant amount when compared
to money put through the UNDP Trust Fund.
17

The establishment of an independent agency with professionally trained individuals to
monitor activity and ensure that national standards are developed and met would provide
quality assurance to donors and engender community support. This idea is developed later in
the report.
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There also appears to be duplication in the duties of the Trust Fund Manager
at UNDP and the international advisers responsible for financial and project
administration who work within the UXO LAO organisation. One example is
that there are two sets of financial records for managing the Trust Fund, one
managed by UXO LAO and the other by UNDP.
UNDP has recognised these concerns and is prepared to take an enhanced
role, for example by assisting with policy development, resource mobilisation,
advocacy and donor coordination. It is also in the process of reviewing staff
duties to ensure that positions compliment and do not duplicate others and
that funds are managed in a timely and efficient manner. It would also be
possible to accommodate concerns about visibility and use of national NGOs
using earmarked funds. Furthermore, if there was a more developed planning
process there should actually be little requirement for ‘unearmarked’ funds.
4.6

Transparency and accountability

Another limitation of the current Trust Fund management structure is that it
only tracks cash through invoices. While this invoice system appears to be
working well, there is, at present, apparently no way to directly connect cash
in with inventory control or procurement. This has significant implications to
observation of transparency and accountability. It is recommended that an
accrual based accounting system be implemented to address these limitations
and to provide more accurate and transparent reporting.
There is a need to reform this aspect of the program, not least to prevent the
program from being vulnerable to possible accusations of impropriety in the
future. The recommendations for planning and options for organisational
change set out later in this report would provide solutions to this problem.
Recommendation: that an accrual based accounting system be
introduced.
4.7

Importance of the UXO issue within Government of Lao
policy

Given the high level of UXO contamination in Lao PDR, and its links to
poverty, some donors expressed concern that the government does not
appear to rate clearance as one of its highest priorities.
This view is supported by the fact that the government is not a signatory to the
Ottawa Treaty, that UXO issues have attracted relatively little attention in the
government’s most important planning forum, the Round Table Process, that
the UXO LAO organisation reports through the Ministry of Labour and Social
Welfare which is regarded as a junior portfolio, and that there is no visible
coordination or policy unit. Donors raised concern that the Steering
Committee does not meet regularly and appears not to have much direct
ownership of UXO clearance activities in Lao PDR.
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However, the Government is considering the Ottawa Treaty. Although there
are no plans to accede to the Treaty in the near future, Lao PDR is not
believed to be a producer or exporter of antipersonnel mines.18 More could
be done to emphasise these positive points. In addition, there is an
opportunity to place UXO on the agenda at future Round Table meetings.
The Lao Government is addressing many challenges in its efforts to raise Lao
from the list of Least Developed Countries by 2020. For example, it is
developing infrastructure, improving agricultural practices, building schools,
training teachers and developing curricula, providing health services and
addressing many other priorities. The government is obliged to make
decisions about how it uses its scarce resources and is unable to contribute
directly to UXO clearance at this time. It estimates its in-kind contribution to
UXO LAO at $200,000 per year.
It appears that the implications of administrative changes to UXO LAO
introduced in 2000 were not thoroughly assessed. In addition to taking on
management responsibility for staffing and logistics, the representation on the
Steering Committee was upgraded to Ministerial, rather than Vice Ministerial
leadership. One consequence of the change has been that, although the
profile of the Committee was raised, it has met less frequently as new
Steering Committee members from more senior government ranks have even
more demands on their time than the previous membership.
There appears to be a consensus from both donors and government that
coordination and planning can be constructively addressed and this is
discussed in a later section of this report.
Two other significant issues are associated with Lao government involvement
in the UXO program. First, demining activities often involve foreign nationals,
many with military training. These advisers may carry explosives in vehicles
around provincial areas. Quite reasonably the government must be satisfied
that appropriate security, safety standards and awareness are being met. The
second issue is that UXO LAO personnel are employed under a different
contract arrangement to government officials and receive higher salaries.
This has created tension between UXO LAO and other government agencies.
4.8

Reluctance or inability of donors to provide funds for
national salaries

As discussed in Section 3, donor funds did not automatically follow the
transfer of Lao staff from NGOs to UXO LAO and centralisation of operations
in 2000.
There are a number of reasons for this. Some donors have explicit policies
that recurrent recipient government costs should not be met by development
assistance funds. Although some exceptions have been made for Lao PDR,
18

International Campaign to Ban Land Mines Landmine Monitor Report 2000.
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most aid is conditional on the recipient government meeting the costs of staff
salaries.
Prior to changes in administrative arrangements whereby staff contracts were
transferred from NGOs to UXO LAO, deminers were paid $150 per month. As
a result of the change, and in recognition that government salaries are
considerably lower than those received by deminers, the salary was reduced
to $115. Approximately sixty staff left the project, a mix of field and office staff.
The transfer appeared desirable to streamline procedures and maximise cost
efficiency in purchasing. Many donors also supported the change as a step
towards institutionalisation. Concern was raised, however, that payment of
salaries would be unsustainable for the Lao Government.
4.9

Public Relations and Resource Mobilisation

Funding for humanitarian purposes is never guaranteed, even for wellformulated proposals. The situation in Laos has attracted very little attention
recently, whereas other countries, such as Afghanistan, have drawn
considerable media attention.
A number of suggestions were made to improve fundraising efforts. These are
set out in more detail in a later section.
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5. UXO Contamination: Defining the problem
5.1

Recognising the limits of aid

Two million tons of bombs spread over millions of hectares. One estimate shared
with the team was that it would take 1300 years to search every square metre of
potentially contaminated ground. It is clear that UXO LAO is not going to maintain
donor interest for such a long period of time!
On the other hand, people in Europe are still killed by explosives left over from the
First World War, so it is entirely likely that the UXO contamination in Lao PDR will
continue to pose a threat for the next century. Nevertheless, it is still unlikely that
donors could commit to a program of such a length.
As discussed in the ‘issues’ section of this report, the lack of a comprehensive
strategic plan is a major concern of donors. Furthermore, feedback from
stakeholders indicates that, to be effective and comprehensive the plan must
cover all elements of mine action, not just clearance.
There is therefore a need to prioritise clearance activity so that the key areas of
need can be addressed in the ‘window’ of funding that is available from donors19.
This suggests that there will need to be a sustainable capacity that will deal with
the UXO problem after donor funds have ceased flowing.
In turn, this logic suggests that there needs to be three phases:
•

A short-term plan to reconfigure current structures to produce a ‘best fit’ for
meeting the requirements of a strategic plan

•

A ‘surge’ capacity to deal with priority land in the medium term, supported by
international funding

•

Nationally funded operation, without any international assistance, of a capacity
to deal with UXO contamination in the long term

Some of the key points that could be covered in each of these phases are set out
below. These are not absolutes; they are a basis for discussion that can assist
stakeholders to determine an agreed strategic approach. Note that, for the
purposes of defining a strategic approach to the overall problem, it is useful to
identify the long-term goals first. This provides the basis for developing a ‘train and
equip’ program that will be necessary to put in place the capacity necessary to
achieve the long-term goals.
19
There are precedents for not clearing every bomb and mine. For example, in the Falkland
Islands, minefields containing approximately 35,000 antipersonnel mines were left in clearly fenced
and marked areas, because they contaminate land of no socio-economic value, pose no threat to
the local population and would be too hazardous and too expensive to clear. The mine action
program in the Falklands was thus limited to cover community awareness, minefield marking and
provision of roving teams to deal with UXO found outside marked areas.
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Long-term planning: designing a sustainable capacity

This section concentrates on what should be left behind after international
assistance ceases. Of course, many of the elements necessary to create a
sustainable UXO capacity already exist in UXO LAO, and subsequent
development work should concentrate on filling the gaps.

5.2.1 UXO Clearance
A sustainable UXO clearance capacity to operate in the long term could be
designed around the following parameters:
•

The focus of developing a sustainable capacity could be based on the current
primary objective of UXO LAO, i.e. to reduce the risk of death or injury from
UXO. To this end, this could involve deployment of roving teams in each
province where there is a problem with UXO contamination to deal with
reported UXO. While there should be a presence in each contaminated
province the size of the presence (i.e. the number of teams) should be
proportionate to the size and impact of the problem. A list of factors that could
be taken into account in the weighting process include:
o The size of the province (which has impact on travelling time)
o The geographical extent of the UXO problem (which has impact on the
likelihood of problems arising)
o The size of the population (which also has an impact on the likelihood of
problems arising)

•

The number of teams could be also based on the number necessary to meet a
minimum performance target, for example, a requirement to meet a maximum
allowable delay between the UXO being reported and being dealt with. A
province could be given sufficient teams to meet a planned response time of 7
days, based on historical data about numbers of UXO reported per month.

•

The distribution of teams, and their efficiency of operation, could also be
continually monitored and re-evaluated against:
o The number of casualties reported every year
o The number of tasks that each team is able to carry out each month

•

One other key criterion in designing a sustainable UXO clearance capacity is
the fact that this will, in all likelihood, be based on a program that is entirely
nationally funded and executed.
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5.2.2 Community Awareness
The community Awareness concept developed by the Ministry of Education in
collaboration with UNICEF appears to be working well and seems to have the
potential for true sustainability.
•

Ideally, the same approach as currently used by the UNICEF funded project to
reach children (i.e. using existing organisations to deliver the message,
reinforced by use of mass media) should be extended to cover all elements of
the population at risk.

•

The community awareness message should include instructions on how items
of UXO that are discovered should be reported, and to which organisation they
should be reported.

•

There should continue to be coordination of UXO clearance and community
awareness programs

•

There should continue to be technical advice on UXO issues available in order
to ensure that the messages given out by the community awareness projects
remain correct.

5.2.3 UXO Database/Archive
The role of the UXO database will continue to be important. Indeed, as time
progresses, its role as an archive will gain importance. Development projects will
need the ability to determine whether an area has been cleared and to what depth
the clearance was undertaken.
It is important that all UXO clearance is recorded in the database. Currently there
is no requirement that commercial demining data is recorded although this has
occurred on a voluntary basis to some extent.

5.2.4 UXO Reporting Mechanism
The development of a responsive UXO clearance program will also depend on the
availability of a structure to receive reports of UXO and pass them on to the
clearance teams. This could be something that could be developed using existing
local resources, such as the local police.

5.2.5 Training Needs Analysis
As part of the planning process, a training needs analysis should be undertaken to
ensure that the training development requirement is taken account of in the plan.
The long-term sustainable program will need to ensure that it can train its own staff
in all necessary skills. Additionally, the long-term plan should also address what
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should be done for UXO LAO staff laid off at the end of the midterm surge activity.
This could include a retraining program.
5.3

Medium term planning: clearing priority land

As has already been identified above, international donor assistance is unlikely to
be available to clear all the land contaminated by UXO in Lao PDR. Therefore, in
the short term, attention should be focussed on three main targets:
•

Developing the roving teams with a view to their being able to meet long term
goals

•

Clearing priority land for development

•

Developing the other attributes of a sustainable UXO program

The development of the roving teams, and the other attributes of a sustainable
program, have already been covered in detail above. This section focuses in more
detail on possible ways to determine strategic priorities for area clearance.

5.3.1 Determining the extent of the response
Given that there is so much contaminated land to clear and so little resources
available to undertake clearance, it is imperative that realistic limits are set on the
UXO clearance program. As one of the priority tasks of UXO LAO is to clear land
for agricultural development, this has been used as the basis for some broad,
approximate calculations of the requirement.
One very useful tool for this is the planning document produced with the
assistance of JICA and published in October 200120. The report is based on
Government of Lao planning targets to raise Lao PDR out of the group of least
developed nations by 2020 and sets out the requirement to develop priority areas
within the 2.1 million hectares of potential agricultural and forestry land within this
time frame. Therefore, there is a case to be made for developing a strategic plan
for UXO area clearance that supports this rural development plan. The JICA report
provides further potential guidance, as the report compares the target land for
agricultural development with UXO contamination data drawn from the UXO LAO
database. One of the maps produced in the JICA reports, showing impact of UXO
contamination on potential lowland rice cultivation is a useful example and is
included for ease of reference at Annex A. This comparison reveals that of these
2.1 million hectares of potential target land for rural development, only some
24,000 hectares is potentially contaminated. We can therefore present a range of
options for designing a clearance program. These are set out below.

20

JICA Master Plan Study on Integrated Agricultural Development in Lao PDR dated Oct 2001
(AFR JR 01 42). We understand that the JICA report has already been adopted for use on an
informal basis as the development ‘Master Plan’.
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Scenario One: Restore to 2001 staffing levels

24,000 hectares is still a great deal of land to be cleared, but as recent
performance statistics of the UXO LAO program reveal, with an average clearance
rate of around 700 hectares per year at 2001 staffing levels, the program could
clear all of the potentially contaminated land that is targeted for rural development
in just under 33 years if current funding targets were met. An extract of the report,
showing the maps used, is included below.
JICA Estimates of Priority Areas
Ser
(a)
1
2
3
4

•

Priority
(b)
High Risk21
Medium Risk
Low Risk
Total

Size (Ha)
(c)
630
3,260
19,790
23,680

Remarks
(d)
630 ha appears less than one year’s work at 2001
figures, though this could depend on the nature of the
ground to be cleared.

Scenario Two: A ten-year target

Clearing all the target land in 33 years would still not meet the Government of Lao
development target of 2020. In broad terms, if the size of the program could be
increased to around 3 times its 2001 size, it could clear the priority target areas in
around 10 years. This would be compatible with the 2020 target for development.
A 10-year clearance program is also compatible with the requirements of the
Ottawa Treaty. See the outline works plan below.
•

Scenario Three: Current staffing

A third option would be to design a program based on current staffing levels.
Although there is not yet much data about the effect the staffing reduction has had
on clearance rates, one can assume, for the purposes of forecasting, that halving
the staff has halved the clearance rate. If this were true, this clearance rate would
allow all of the target land set out in the JICA report to be cleared in some 70
years22. This may also be too long a period to expect continued international
support; however, as the JICA report does divide the potentially contaminated land
into high medium and low priorities, so it may be possible to set a strategic target
that is based on clearing the higher priority areas whilst continuing to deploy roving
clearance teams that deal with the most important task of reducing risk.
Ideally, the program should be funded to achieve the 10-year target. Although this
appears the most expensive, perhaps, as it would probably cost more or less the
same to employ 3000 people for 10 years as it does to employ 1000 people for 30
21

The ‘risk’ is based on advice from the UXO LAO database and is, apparently, a function of how
near the agricultural land to the nearest contaminated area. The use of risk as one criterion for
deciding priority of agricultural clearance would tally with the overall priority role of the program,
which is to reduce casualties.
22
This figure is based on the broad assumption that the clearance rate is halved if the staffing
levels are halved. However, if this lower staff level is maintained it may be appropriate to reduce
the amount of effort expended on area clearance in order to provide more support to the first
priority targets: deployment of roving teams to respond to reported UXO that represent the greatest
threat to public safety.

24

DRAFT

Assessment mission of the Lao UXO Trust Fund and the UXO LAO Mine Action Programme

DRAFT

years, there is little actual saving to be made by stretching out the program,
especially as equipment (another major program cost) would have to be replaced
several times over the longer period. It should therefore be possible to compare
the short cost of loading the program ‘up front’ over a 10-year period against the
opportunity cost of clearing the land more slowly. The longer it takes to clear the
land targeted for rural development, the longer it will be before that land can be
productive. However, there also appear to be a number of ways by which the
program could be more productive through increased cost effectiveness. Some
ideas for improving cost effectiveness are included at Annex B.
These scenarios are subject to a number of assumptions. It is assumed that the
rate of clearance achieved in by UXO LAO is representative of the national
problem. If the extent and type of contamination varies output will vary
accordingly. Other factors can potentially affect clearance: it is reasonable to
assume that the rate will increase as deminers gain more experience of if new
techniques become available. As mentioned above, these scenarios are based on
current techniques that do not take account of potential for increasing cost
effectiveness (see Annex B). Furthermore, all activity should be subject to regular
review to ensure that targets are met or modified if necessary.
Recommendation: That a program be developed to clear priority agricultural
areas in a ten year timeframe (Scenario 2)

5.3.2 Other development targets
Agricultural development targets are listed in the UXO LAO program
documentation as being the second priority task (casualty reduction being the first
priority), and the JICA report provides a means for estimating how big a task this
might be. However, it is not suggested that only agricultural tasks are carried out
by UXO LAO. There may be other tasks that are necessary, either in support of
rural development (such as clearing land for irrigation schemes) or in support of
the overall economic development of Lao PDR. In the past, many such tasks have
not been a priority of UXO LAO, for a number of reasons (these are covered in
more detail in the ‘issues’ section of this report). In principle, there should be no
reason why the program cannot carry out a task that is in support of an economic
development project and is, as such, deemed necessary by the relevant
competent authority. It should be balanced against the opportunity cost of clearing
agricultural land. In other words, other development projects23 could be supported
where their net benefit can be demonstrated as being greater than the benefit
generated by employing the same clearance resources on agricultural land.
There is a separate, though related issue, which is to determine the appropriate
means of paying for such project-based work. In principle, it may be possible to

23

There is a need for the program to develop clearer guidelines on what constitutes a development
project. For example, we understand that telecommunications projects would not count as
development projects because telecommunications projects are themselves profit generating.
Potential users of demining assets to support such projects should be directed towards commercial
mine action service providers. On the other hand, work supporting infrastructure projects may be a
valid use of humanitarian mine action resources.
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allocate resources to support non-agricultural projects on a cost recovery basis.
The concept of cost recovery is addressed in a later section of this report.

5.3.3 Developing a strategic action plan
Once the broad
length of the
program has been
decided, and once
the nature of tasks
that are eligible for
inclusion is
determined, it
should be possible
to develop a
strategic action
plan.

Strategic Action Plan

Components

Sub Components

Related Activity

Province 1

Strategic
Action Plan

Roving Team
Plan

Province 2

Area Clearance
Plan

Province 3

Community
Awareness Plan

Province 4 etc

Trauma care

Community
development

medical clinics

Victim
Assistance Plan
Rehabilitation

Basic Training

Training Needs

Analysis
The plan should
Training Plan
Advanced
include a number
Training
of components
that, together,
International
Museum
Media Campaign
make up the
Strategic Action Plan
Components
Sub Components
Related Activity
strategic response.
For example, the
Figure 5/1. Possible outline structure of a strategic action plan
strategic plan
could be broken up
into a number of component areas such as roving clearance, area clearance and
community awareness. The main components could then be divided up by
province (or by other subcomponent divisions) and then divided again into a
number of discrete projects that could then be planned in detail. This subdivision
process is represented in the diagram at Figure 5/1 above. The development of
discrete projects also allows the identification of related activities that, whilst not
mine action per se, are projects that would connect with the activities of the
program, such as the development of a museum that would help educate visitors
to Lao PDR on the subject of UXO contamination and clearance, or the
development of clinics as an ‘added value’ service provided by the site medics24.

The diagram at Figure 5.1 represents a simplified version; there could be many
other projects that could be included. For example, one such project could be “the
design and implementation of community based community awareness program in
province X intended to target adult males involved in the illegal recovery of scrap
metal and explosives from UXO”. Another such project might be “the training,
equipping and operating of roving clearance teams in one of the provinces that
has not has yet had any UXO clearance support.” Dividing the strategic plan into

24

The question of using site medics to provide external medical services is addressed in slightly
more detail in Annex B.
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discrete projects may have benefits in terms of resource mobilisation, which is
discussed in a later section of this report.
There is also a need to add a timescale to program activity. The works plan that
follows is an outline of the major activities that could be undertaken in a 10-year
action plan. As explained above, all of these major activities would in turn have a
large number of subsidiary tasks that take place within them. .
The use of a surge capacity means that extra teams would be brought on line at
the beginning of the medium term, trained and equipped, and then operated with
international supervision for a short while. Once the teams were effective they
could then operate with reduced international monitoring until the end of the
medium term planning process. This reduction could form the basis for planning
an exit strategy for international assistance.
Recommendation: Develop a Strategic Plan to achieve a ten-year target (this
is further discussed in Section 7 of this report).

5.3.4 Prioritisation
As identified above, there are not enough resources to tackle all the contamination
in Lao PDR in the foreseeable future. Therefore the program should take steps to
develop the methodology to determine priorities for the annual works plan, so that
the most important areas are cleared first. Furthermore, the prioritisation process
should be transparent; this will have the added benefit of allowing donors to match
inputs to outputs and thus help build donor and community confidence. At the
moment, the lack of clear prioritisation criteria leaves the program potentially open
to criticism about which land is being cleared. Some notes on possible criteria for
objective prioritisation are set out in Annex C.
The options for developing an organisational structure for implementation are
discussed in more detail in the following section.
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Figure 5/2. Outline Strategic Works Plan for Scenario 2

Figure 5/2 shows the outline strategic works plan for Scenario 2 (a 10 year program) as presented above. The key points to note
are that the expatriate involvement could be reduced once the surge capacity is fully trained, and that all operations after 2014
would be fully staffed and funded by Lao PDR resources.
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Figure 5/3. Outline staffing/funding profile for planning scenarios

This graph shows the staffing/funding profile for the three planning scenarios presented above. For outline planning purposes, it is
assumed at this stage that the funding levels would correlate with the numbers of staff hired, though as noted in this document there
are several technical or procedural innovations that may achieve the same clearance targets with less staff. Cost effectiveness
issues are considered below at Annex B.
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Short-term planning: recovery from crisis

It will take a while to make the detailed plans needed to put some flesh on the
bones of the outlines set out here. Initial estimates are around 4-5 months to
develop the plan, with time needed after that to mobilise resources. It is estimated
that the ten-year plan discussed above could be implemented around the
beginning of 2004.
In the meantime, there will be need for a short-term plan for activity by the
program while the long-term plans are being developed. This should set out the
requirement necessary to protect the current assets of the program and the
investment that has already been made in equipment and training. UNDP reports
that there is funding to maintain current levels of staff till the end of the third
quarter of 2003. However, if the project is be funded to the levels necessary to
clear the major development targets described above it will be particularly
important to re-recruit as many of the laid off staff as possible, as soon as
possible, in order to prevent de-skilling of this element of the workforce. With a
good plan with good targets, improved organisational structure and improved
resource mobilisation the program should be able to meet its funding targets
Annexes to Section 5:
A. JICA Planning Map: UXO Contamination and Potential Lowland Rice
B. Maximising Cost Effectiveness
C. Identifying Priorities
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6. Ideas for organisational change
This section includes notes on
•

Separating coordination from implementation

• Notes on the possible role for UNDP
•

Options for new structures

•

Notes on the proposed new structure for implementing organisations

6.1

Identifying parameters

The previous sections have set out the issues facing the Lao UXO clearance
program, and lay out some ideas for defining the strategic targets at which the
program should aim. There remain two major questions:
•

What is the best organisational structure to meet these targets?

•

What are the options for funding a successful program?

The team has identified a number of options that may serve as a basis for
discussion. These options are set out in this section of the report. Options for
funding are addressed in the following section (Section 7).
In considering options, the team has considered the likelihood that each structure
can address the issues identified earlier, especially:
•

Improving transparency and donor confidence

•

Improving efficiency in processes and reducing procedural blockages

•

Improving coordination and communication

6.1.1 Coordination and implementation issues
All of the options considered by the team shared one common theme, which is the
need to separate the functions of planning, regulation and coordination from
implementation. The main reasons for this are to place more importance on the
need for coordination and that regulatory functions of government should be
independent. However, it is important to stress that the process of dividing
coordinator from implementer is unlikely to be sufficient, by itself, to meet all donor
concerns, as many donors have made it clear to the team that they would rather
fund implementer organisations directly and/or they cannot fund UXO LAO staff
directly as long as they are considered to be government personnel. This
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separation of coordinator from implementer is a necessary initial stage to further
structural change.
Recommendation: that the planning, coordination and regulatory functions
of UXO LAO be administratively separate from implementation.
In making these changes it will be important to resolve the confusion over the
overlapping coordination roles undertaken by/mandated to UXO LAO and the
National Steering Committee Office (NSCO). It is proposed that the coordination
body encompass many functions currently undertaken by UXO LAO and also the
secretariat function. This would accord with Prime Minister’s Decree No 75 by
maintaining the steering committee secretariat function within a coordinating
agency. . In principle, people should be reallocated along with their function. For
example the team who currently manage the database would move to the
coordinating body where the database would reside.
More detail on developing coordination is set out in more detail at Annex A, whilst
the two options for implementation structures are covered in Annexes B and C.
6.1.2 Reaffirming Lao leadership
At first glance some of these ideas it may appear that it is being suggested that the
existing ‘implementing partners’ are being given control over the program. This is
simply not so. In fact, the ideas are intended to reinforce and reaffirm Lao
leadership by focussing on the development of strategic capacity in management,
planning and coordinating. The development of clear guidelines for the
involvement of the existing implementing partners (and indeed any new mine
action service providers) should help set the parameters for appropriate
decentralisation in line with the current policy of the Government of Lao.
Some ideas for ensuring the primacy of Lao managerial involvement are set out in
more detail below at Annex D.
6.1.3 Donor relationships and UNDP role
For the purposes of clarity, donor contractual relationships with implementers
and/or UNDP and the Lao UXO Trust Fund are not shown in the diagrams below.
The following points cover the potential for the development of the role and
activities of UNDP:
•

UNDP should continue to assist in resource mobilisation for the program.

•

UNDP could develop the role that it has with the Lao UXO Trust Fund to
ensure that it is monitoring all stages of the program on behalf of donors. This
should involve all elements of quality management in order to build donor
confidence in the management of their donations.
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•

UNDP could assist with the provision of high-level technical advice and
program support to the new coordination body. One key position that requires
further technical assistance is the Finance Manager. If current funding
arrangements through Norwegian People’s Aid lapse, UNDP should consider
funding this position.

•

UNDP can assist the Government of Lao with taking the message about the
contamination problem and the clearance program to the international
community. UNDP could assist in the production of a briefing package that
could be used in UN Headquarters and by Lao PDR embassies worldwide.
UNDP could also assist in arranging field visits for donor representatives.

A possible logical framework for UNDP activity is included at Annex E.
Annexes to Section 6:
A. Developing more effective coordination
B. Option One - Decentralised Implementation
C. Option Two - decentralised implementation with centralised service support
D. Developing partnerships in service provision
E. UNDP assistance to UXO coordination body in Lao PDR: Logical Framework
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7. Towards sustainable funding
There are several steps that could be undertaken to improve the programs
success in resource mobilisation. These include:
•
•
•
•
•

Making use of a strategic action plan
Seeking other funding sources
Cost recovery
Development related project design
Loans

These are each discussed below.
7.1

Making use of a strategic action plan

In the absence of a single donor willing to provide funding for the entire range
of projects necessary to complete clearance of priority areas in a ten year time
period, it is proposed that a strategic action plan be formulated to break the
task of implementation into smaller elements that could be funded and
managed as separate activities. This is essentially an extension of the current
approach where different NGOs work in different provinces and other
agencies have clearly identified roles in community awareness and training.
A planned approach is needed to attract international support, ensure
community confidence, set priorities in descending order and develop a
participatory approach to securing government financial support.
The major change is that the coordinating agency takes a strategic and
proactive role in defining projects and seeking funds. There are many
countries seeking support for mine clearance and Lao must define its priorities
and make them available to appropriate donors. The aim should be a
strategic ten-year plan for coordinated UXO clearance activity in Lao PDR.
A graphical representation of a possible structure for a strategic action plan is
set out above at Figure 5/1 in Section 5. The diagram shows how the action
plan can be divided into a number of different sized projects ranging from
UXO clearance and roving teams to media awareness, education and training
and other options currently not considered in the context of UXO projects.
Each unit can then be developed into short proposals for presentation to
donors. These could include a description of the project, identification of
benefits to local communities as well as the donor agency, and a brief costing.
Proposals should also provide information on various funding mechanisms
including use of the UNDP Trust Fund, or the option of working directly with
an NGO.
The output of this part of the process would be a selection of projects, with
varying aims, tasks and costs. Donors have different interests and priorities,

36

DRAFT

Assessment mission of the Lao UXO Trust Fund and the UXO LAO Mine Action Programme

some view UXO clearance as a humanitarian issue, whilst others would be
more likely to link their support with development outcomes. Donors also
have different budgets; different time horizons for projects and some can offer
differing in-kind support. Some donors may have expertise in training, others
in community awareness and others in demining activities. The short
proposals are intended to match opportunities with donor agencies. This is a
significant change from the current approach to soliciting donor support and
will require more effort. There is a risk that it is very labour intensive for the
Coordination Agency and adequate resources will be needed to ensure that
the process is equitable. Nevertheless, this approach allows each project to
be developed within the constraints of the donor agency, and, once donor
interest is established, proposals can be finalised by, or in consultation with,
sponsors.
7.2

Seeking other funding sources

The plan will also provide a basis for approaching funding agencies not
currently supporting activities in Lao PDR. These include the embassies that
fund development projects in Lao PDR but have not funded UXO clearance,
other UN mine action programs such as ‘Adopt a Minefield’ and private
foundations. In short, the program should be more proactive in its research of
potential donors.
7.3

Cost recovery

A further element of the project is to further develop cost recovery in mine
action. Although the possibility of UXO LAO undertaking cost recovery
activities has been raised on many occasions, the agency has not taken its
focus away from its narrow focus on humanitarian functions. Cost recovery
offers an opportunity to maintain staffing levels, to raise funds for other
clearance activity and to meet broader community and development
objectives. UXO LAO has been approached to undertake paid work in the
past, an indication that there is a willingness to employ UXO LAO and provide
funding for the organisation to diversify its activities. It could be entirely
possible that area clearance work could be carried out in support of funded
agricultural development projects. Indeed, as area clearance is expensive
and slow it is vital to ensure that any land cleared is going to be put to use
immediately. One way to do that is to ensure that the development of that land
is already funded; by extension, if the proper cost benefit analysis of the whole
project (demining and development) has been done it should be possible to
include the cost of area clearance as a line item on the cost of the
development project. This would also engage other actors, i.e. the
development agencies, as fund mobilisers for the clearance.
If the use of cost recovery could be developed extensively (and again this
depends on the development of a strategic action plan) then it would be
possible to use funds mobilised for more general, ‘emergency’ projects to
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support casualty reduction, i.e. the roving teams and community awareness
projects.
One current constraint that UXO LAO is not permitted to use any of the
resources provided to it for humanitarian purposes to be used for commercial
outcomes. However, an extension of current financial management practices
to accrual accounting would allow the full cost of each activity to be
assessed25.
There are two related issues to resolve:
•

The first is to determine what is actually meant by ‘humanitarian’ mine
action. At the moment, essential development tasks for communities, such
as infrastructure, are not normally undertaken by UXO LAO teams. This
could mean that a village can have its land cleared but can not get water to
that land because UXO LAO cannot support the clearance of an irrigation
project. Many development agencies have already addressed this issue.
For example, in the Balkans the World Bank supported most infrastructure
projects but did not support telecommunications projects because the high
rate of return on investment meant that the project would attract
commercial investment and so bank development loans were
unnecessary. A similar approach could be taken with area clearance in
Lao PDR. In other words, infrastructure that is going to benefit Lao PDR as
a whole but is not making a commercial profit (such as road construction)
could be undertaken by an arm of the program providing the necessary
accrual accounting procedures were in place.

•

The second is to determine how to incorporate wholly commercial projects
into the program. It may be possible for an element of the program to be
set aside for commercial work (providing they were not using resources
intended for humanitarian activity) on profit making projects such as
telecommunications or mineral extraction. This could easily be done by
contract26; licensing requirements could ensure the commercial projects
would bear the full cost of the mine action carried out on their behalf.
Furthermore, the surplus generated by the commercial arm would then be
put into the Trust Fund.

25

A further benefit of accrual accounting is that all activities are fully costed and should
ensure that all operations are cost effective. One example is that, under current
administrative arrangements UXO LAO implementation activities are managed at a provincial
level and roving teams do not cross provincial borders. If a UXO is reported to be within close
proximity to a roving team, that team cannot respond to a request to cross provincial
boundaries. By contrast, if activities were fully costed reciprocal arrangements could be
made for emergency clearance tasks.
26
Commercial clearance work does not have to be done by an existing part of the program.
Clearance contracts can be let by open, competitive tendering amongst commercial demining
contractors and the customer can pay a licence fee as part of the clearance contract that
would then be passed on by the contractor to the coordinating body. As part of the licencing
process the coordinating body can assist the customer with project design and even provide
independent quality assurance on a cost recovery basis.
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There is a lot of work to be done to set up a transparent and cost effective
cost recovery program; this does not mean that it cannot be done, and the
high volume of funding currently going into infrastructure projects could
contribute greatly to reducing the overall costs of the humanitarian elements
of the UXO clearance program.

7.4

Development related project design

Many suggestions have been made to link UXO clearance with development
outcomes including provision of bonded training in electronics and vehicle
maintenance, training team medics to provide basic health clinics in a nearby
village or, in the case of Xieng Khouang, the establishment of a UXO Museum
to boost the local economy from tourists who currently visit the Plain of Jars.
Training in agricultural techniques could also maximise benefits from cleared
land. These would have the benefit of being able to attract funds for elements
of the program from new sources (bonded training in electronics could help
the maintenance of the program’s equipment, for example). Such projects
would also have the additional benefit of raising the profile of the program.

7.5

Loans

The final possible funding source to be considered is the possibility of
structural loans provided by the World Bank or Asian Development Bank. This
could be particularly interesting to the government towards the end of the
proposed 10 year concentrated clearance program set out in this report, as a
means for funding the sustainable element of the program once donations
cease.
There is an impact to Lao PDR on adding to its existing debt profile. However,
the cost of the UXO program even at today’s cost is small compared to some
of the major infrastructure loans already in place. Furthermore, a more
detailed cost benefit analysis of the opportunity cost of uncleared land could
make a good case for such a loan. It is recommended that a structural loan
for clearance be considered as part of the strategic planning process.
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8. Conclusions
As reported above, the UXO program in Lao PDR has been very successful in
establishing and developing the technical capacity to deal with UXO
contamination. However, the current program still faces a funding crisis and,
although the changing situation in other parts of the world means that some
funding is going elsewhere, there are still significant funds that would be
available to the program in Lao if only a number of issues could be resolved.
The issues are reported at length in the body of this report, but can be
summarised as being concerns about:
•

Planning and prioritisation

•

Lao Government support

•

Organisational structure27

Some donors have made it very clear that fundamental reforms need to be
made if funding is to be made available. The report has made a number of
recommendations for approaches that could address these issues and
therefore could help allow sufficient funds to flow to allow the program to
function effectively. This mission has attempted to clarify the current situation
on behalf of the stakeholders and prepare the ground for the donors and the
Government of Lao to agree on the most suitable way forwards.
However, one main conclusion that can be drawn from these findings is that
there is a need to take a strategic approach to addressing the issues. There
appears to be no simple fix, nor any one or two small procedural adjustments
that can be made to ‘tweak’ the status quo arrangements. On the other hand,
it is also worth pointing out that there is no technical reason why any of these
changes cannot be made. There is a lot of expertise available in the UXO
LAO program and UNDP have already undertaken to help provide additional
expertise if it is required.
In particular, it is worth stressing that any strategy that is adopted must focus
on the impact that the program is having on the wider development of Lao
PDR rather than on the narrow measurements of performance indicators such
as numbers of bombs disposed of or even hectares of land cleared. Given the
huge distribution of contamination and the limited resources at hand, even in
the most generous funding environment, it will be vital to establish a robust
and transparent prioritisation mechanism that optimises socio-economic
benefits and cost effectiveness.

27
In particular the requirement that Lao national staff are employed by UXO LAO which is
viewed by donors as a government agency
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Annex A to Section 3: UXO LAO Income, 1996-2001
Ser

(a)

Contributor
1996-1997

1998

(c)

(d)

(b)

Year
1999
Contribution (US$)
(e)

Total
2000

2001

(f)

(g)

(i)

Un–earmarked
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Australia
Canada
Finland
Japan
Luxembourg
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
South Korea
Interest

470,595

198,675
135,762

290,135

300,000
303,758
933,952
96,664

11 Subtotal un–earmarked

242,924
220,000

34,747
500,000

2,395,104

398,406

20,000
380,228

182,243

112,733

1,314,071

95,074

250,000
471,220

250,000
500,000
103,500
279,230

276,395

669,270
331,669
581,092
242,924
754,747
1,771,220
427,258
2,268,211
545,241

153,601

1,111,647

i

100,833
290,957

1,389,405

1,381,405
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Earmarked
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Denmark
Denmark
USA
Sweden
USA
Belgium
New Zealand
United Kingdom
Australia
Luxembourg
Canada
Japan
Norway

2,739,833

396,224

100,000

360,000

882,000

750,000
394,737
81,624

70,036

394,176

132,506
138,020
369,173

77,706

220,000

356,000

Other contributions
Ser
Contributor
1996-1997
(b)
(c)
UNDP
400,000
UNDP
1,720,000
UNICEF
Miscellaneous
Subtotal other
2,120,000
Total Other Income

33 Total by year

74,309

182,482

25 Subtotal earmarked
1,972,357
1,326,361
26 Total Income though the Lao PDR UXO Trust Fund

(a)
27
28
29
30
31
32

3,136,057
400,000
1,342,000
394,176
750,000
394,737
436,181
138,020
369,173
220,000
182,482
356,000

400,000

6,487,461

3,389,869

Year
1999
Contribution (US$)

1998
(d)

(e)

2,640,432

ii

1,355,930

8,118,826
15,710,458

Total
2000

2001

(f)

(g)

224,048
389,045

124,385
-

74,309

267,272
368,524

124,385

613,093

635,796

4,625,901

2,076,807

3,373,131
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(i)
400,000
1,720,000
491,320
881,954
3,493,274
3,493,274

19,203,732
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Annex B to Section 3: UXO LAO Expenditure, 1996-2001
Ser

(a)

Contributor
1996-1997

1998

(c)

(d)

(b)

Year
1999
Contribution (US$)

Total
2000

2001

(f)

(g)

(e)

(i)

Un–earmarked expenditure
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Australia
Canada
Finland
Japan
Luxembourg
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
South Korea
Interest

200,000

218,714

200,000
138,816
210,584

11 Subtotal un–earmarked

749,400

221,999

84,135

20,000

34,747
100,000
1,292
871,774

37,257
30,500
108,805
459,346

1,310, 652

28,567
236,595

1,393,907

iii

242,924
432,743
259,552
74,845
447,277

250,000
532,712
103,500
279,230

669,270
331,669
581,092
242,924
754,747
1,452,764
427,258
2,268,211

351,043

318,528

669,571

95,074
290,957

2,073,546

1,870,001
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12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Denmark
Denmark
USA
Sweden
USA
Belgium
New Zealand
United Kingdom
Australia
Luxembourg
Canada
Japan
Norway

1,190,831

424,443
400,000

211,818
71,248
138,020

51,500

92,172

73,219

74,375

70,081

79,202

123,038

119,066
140,798
20,028

301,000

55,000

250,107
39,416

(c)
46,721
400,000
524,982

UNDP
UNDP
UNICEF
Miscellaneous
Subtotal other
33 Total Other Expenditure

34 Total by year

3,122,936
400,000
887,471
394,176
143,672
394,737
376,228
138,020
369,173
220,000
182,482
356,000

787,471

182,919
87,305

1996-1997
(b)

586,582

100,000

Other expenditure
Ser
Contributor

UNDP Adm. Chg.

921,080

394,176

25 Subtotal earmarked
854,678
2,235,200
26 Total Expenditure from the Lao PDR UXO Trust Fund

(a)
27
28
29
30
31
32
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1998
(d)
103,277

2,529,060

Year
1999
Contribution (US$)
(e)
76,499

1,175,046

924,982

1,232,554

4,720,898

2,713,799

iv

6,984,895
14,382,401

2001
(g)
99,213

7,323
197,082
194,773
87,338

1,536,306

Total
2000
(f)
93,195

12,649
74,689
1,175,046

1,126,157

(i)
418,905
400,000
1,720,000
506,847
642,738

235,076
447,965
399,178

3,598,881

683,041

3,269,585

4,089,348

3,269,585
17,651,986
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Annex C to Section 3: Balances Brought Forward, 1996-2001
Ser

(a)

Contributor
1996-1997

1998

(c)

(d)

(b)

Year
1999
Contribution (US$)

Total
2000

2001

(f)

(g)

(e)

(i)

Carry over from Un–earmarked funds
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Australia
Canada
Finland
Japan
Luxembourg
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
South Korea
Interest

270,595
290,135
100,000
164,942
723,368

250,566
206,000
500,000
163,650
250,000

28,567
135,762
242,924
182,743
139,500
74,845
170,882

290,957
351,168
-

318,456
-

96,664

278,907

391,640

40,597

(124,330)

11 Subtotal un–earmarked

1,645,704
Carry over from earmarked funds
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Denmark
Denmark
USA
Sweden
USA
Belgium
New Zealand
United Kingdom
Australia
Luxembourg
Canada
Japan
Norway

400,000
-

1,649,123

1,366,863

682,722

194,126

(211,818)
61,258
369,173
143,066

(1,190,831)
400,000
750,000
55,577
119,066
20,028

1,124,559
1,110,000
52,394
79,202
-

203,479
1,058,500
52,328
-

13,121
1,060,857
59,953
-

356,000

55,000

-

-

-

25 Subtotal earmarked

1,117,679

208,840

2,366,155

v

1,314,307

1,133,931
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Carry over from other contributions
Ser
Contributor
1996-1997
(a)
26
27
28
29
30
31

(b)
UNDP
UNDP
UNICEF
Miscellaneous
Subtotal other

Total by year

(c)
1,195,018
-
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Year
1999
Contribution (US$)

1998
(d)
19,972
-

(e)
7,323
(74,689)
124,385

Total
2000

2001

(f)
(47,723)
318,657

(g)
(15,527)
239,216

(i)

1,195,018

19,972

57,019

270,934

223,689

3,958,401

1,877,935

3,790,037

2,267,963

1,551,746

vi
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Annex D to Section 3: Summary of Expenditure Breakdown for UXO LAO, 1996-2001
Ser

Expenditure
1996-1997
National
Intl.

(a)
1
2
3
4
5
7
8
9
10
11

(b)
Personnel Cost
Income Tax
Operating Cost
Supplies
Equipment
Unspecified
Implementing Partners
Special Projects
UN Support
Total

(c)

(d)

Year
1999
National
Intl.

1998
National
Intl.
(e)
218,797

(f)
296,134

3,492,695
611,785

2000
National
Intl.

2001
National
Intl.

(g)
856,349
164,596
231,972
118,863
51,985

(h)
(i)
267,164 1,376,279
261,259
371,271
312,797
84,254

(j)
(k)
347,426 1,631,180
336,061
587,134
270,036
95,117

945,598

700,000
52,400
93,195

250,831
421,675
99,213

(l)
398,100

2,477,862

46,720

105,520
2,524,582

76,499
4,724,931
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2,713,026

3,598,881
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Annex A to Section 5: JICA Planning Map28: UXO Contamination and
Potential Lowland Rice

28

This map is Figure 4.3 in Part One of the JICA Report
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Annex B Section 5: Maximising cost effectiveness
Although the above scenarios set out the general implications of funding
levels on clearance rates, it is not suggested that the program should merely
be funded to work in a ‘business as usual’ manner. There are a number of
technical and procedural innovations that could be considered as means to
increase cost effectiveness. These are set out below.
•

An objective evaluation of available brush cutting machinery that could
help release deminers from cutting vegetation and maximise the time
available for actual clearance.

•

An objective evaluation of the potential to use villagers to clear vegetation
on clearance tasks instead of using deminers29. If successful, this could be
used in conjunction with brush cutting machinery.

•

A trial of some of the techniques already being considered in Xieng
Khouang Province to use villagers to assist with the less technical
elements of the search process. With the right training and procedures it
may be possible to greatly increase the rate of clearance by having UXO
LAO deminers each supervising a number of civilian searchers.

•

A trial of dogs as a means for searching for UXO contamination which may
be able to speed up clearance rates, particularly in areas of high metal
contamination where mine detectors react to false alarms.

•

There may be other areas that could improve cost effectiveness on a
smaller scale that, incrementally, could contribute significant savings. For
example:
o Greater use of shaped charge demolition techniques could help the
teams reduce the amount of explosive used on each bomb.
o It is recommended that the program consider amalgamating the role
of survey teams and roving teams and reorganise them into 3person EOD teams with a team leader, team member and
driver/medic30. The amalgamation of the survey and roving team
would save the extra journeys (and hence delay) between survey
and clearance of spot tasks.

29

Discussion with WFP suggests that it may also be possible to provide incentives for the
involvement of villagers in the project as an extension of the WFP ‘Food for Work’ project in
that is already under way in Lao PDR.
30
The team leader could determine whether any reported task was suitable for them (i.e. was
a ‘spot’ task) or whether it needed systematic area clearance. Once this analysis was
complete, the team leader, who would be a more qualified EOD technician, could then deal
with the spot task with the assistance of the team member. The driver would not need to be
EOD qualified but should be a qualified medic able to give assistance in the event of a UXO
accident.
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o

There should be a re-evaluation of the team structure to address
the number of people that re left ‘standing idle’ during clearance
tasks. This is particularly important in times of reduced funding and
reduced staffing. This re-evaluation should be able to identify those
people who are required for emergency reasons, such as the
medics. Additionally, it may highlight the potential for redeploying
the additional drivers and team leaders.

o A related question of cost effectiveness would be to see if it was
possible to develop the role of the site medics so that they could
provide medical clinic services to the surrounding villages whilst
working at the locations. This would add more value to the local
area and also ensure that the medics did not get ‘out of practice’ in
the (thankfully) long periods between UXO accidents.
If it was possible to introduce a culture of innovation it may be possible to
identify and trial other such ideas throughout the life of the program and work
on means to increase cost effectiveness.
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Annex C Section 5: Identifying priorities
Within the overall framework of a strategic plan there is a need to develop
prioritisation criteria to assist in the preparation of the annual works plan. This
is important in the case of the UXO LAO program to develop donor
confidence. In particular, there appears to be too much clearance carried out
‘outside the plan’ Which implies that the planning process is not very effective.
How then should this be addressed? Perhaps the first point to make here is
that, in principle, UXO clearance agencies are not best qualified to determine
priorities; this should be agreed by the development agencies and
communities that the demining is intended to support, with appropriate
technical advice from the demining agencies. Given the fact that UXO
clearance assets are a scarce resource, it is vital that the agencies that
coordinate development plans, have a prime role in determining the priority for
clearance. Of course, there is also a very important role for the Provinces in
prioritisation, and this becomes even more important given the Government of
Lao policy of decentralisation. One way to achieve balance between the
centre and the periphery in such issues is for the central government to
establish clear planning criteria on which prioritisation by the provincial
authorities can be based. Such criteria also provide a base for identifying
performance indicators against which the program can be assessed. This also
provides greater transparency, allows inputs to be measured against outputs
and helps builds donor confidence in the program.
Weighting mechanisms can be used to determine the appropriate distribution
of roving and clearance teams between Provinces in an equitable manner. It
may also be appropriate, in the case of area clearance teams, to consider the
relative economic potential of each province.
A second level of prioritisation can be based on socio-economic criteria, such
as:
•

The number of people that will benefit from the task

•

The economic benefit that will accrue to the community

•

The cost of the clearance

As a third level of prioritisation, it may be useful to take into account whether
or not the development project that is planned to follow the clearance is
actually funded.
Once such criteria are established and endorsed by the appropriate central
authorities, provincial authorities, managers of the UXO program and donors
can use them to ensure that the most deserving tasks are selected.
Furthermore, post clearance follow-up monitoring activity can be undertaken
to ensure that the land is actually being used for the stated purpose.
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The cost benefit analyses that have already been carried out on the work of
the UXO LAO program may also provide more detailed guidance on the
development of transparent and effective prioritisation criteria.
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Annex A Section 6: Developing more effective coordination
It is recommended that the ‘coordination’ body should take on all of the following
functions31:
•

Advice on UXO Policy for the Government of Lao PDR, including provision of
secretariat function to top level government representatives in the national
steering committee32

•

Regulating implementers, including development of M OU (in cooperation with
relevant donor representatives) and licensing arrangements

•

Setting technical standards for all mine action activities in Lao PDR

•

Development of strategic plans (such as the 10 year action plan recommended
in the previous section of this report) and annual works plans, including
coordination of resource mobilisation

•

Provision of prioritisation guidelines to provincial authorities

•

Coordination of all Mine Action activity in Lao PDR, including:
o All demining, including emergency response and demining in support of
development and all commercial demining
o Community awareness
o Victim assistance

•

Quality management, quality assurance and quality control, including audit,
monitoring and accident investigation functions

•

Preparation and dissemination of public information material at a national level

•

Management of national UXO database

Funds will be needed to ensure that the coordinating body is able to fulfil its duties.
These could be raised through direct support from a donor, through a small levy
on the value of each project or through a license fee. Further input from donors
and the Government of Lao will be needed to agree on an appropriate mechanism.

31

This concept assumes that appropriate decision-making powers will be delegated to the
coordination body and to the implementing organisations.
32
This concept assumes that higher-level decision-making will be extended to involve existing
cross sector coordination bodies such as the CPC and to provide donors with a means to be
represented
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Annex B Section 6: Option One - Decentralised Implementation
The first structural option is based on the development of a small coordination
body that is fully staffed and supported as described above presiding over a
number of decentralised implementing partners.

Implementation
In this option, implementers would report o the coordination organisation while
also taking on full responsibility for management of their own projects, within the
terms of reference of their MOU, including:
•

Assisting with fundraising/resource mobilisation for their projects

•

Developing a works plan within their strategic targets, including preparation of
a comprehensive exit strategy for international involvement

•

Managing their own project finance

•

Recruiting and paying for their own staff and training them to meet standards33

•

Providing and maintaining their own equipment

This option builds on the successful steps taken to standardise key practices, such
as technical operating procedures, salary levels and national planning. It also
decentralises the program in line with Government of Lao policy whilst also
recognising donor preferences. It is also a project that remains firmly under Lao
management34.

Advantages
This option has the advantages of
•

Clear separation of responsibilities between regulator and implementer

•

Being the structure that is most responsive to donor preferences, particularly in
terms of transparency, cost effectiveness and efficiency.

Disadvantages
This option would require considerable change.

33

There are some sub-options that can be considered in regards to training. For example, it may be
possible that the training can be brought in from a specialised service provider. This is also
considered in the options considered below.

xviii

DRAFT

Assessment mission of the Lao UXO Trust Fund and the UXO LAO Mine Action Programme

DRAFT
Annex B

Option One
Government
of Lao

decentralised implementation

Steering Committee

Coordination
Body

Implementing
organisation
Boxes with heavy
borders represent
the sustainable
element of the
program

Implementing
organisation

Implementing
organisation

Note: the actual number of
implementation
organisations may vary

Implementing
organisation

Each implementing organisation would be responsible for
developing the element of the project that would be
sustainable after the end of international funding

Figure 6/1. Outline organisation chart for Option One
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Annex C Section 6: Option Two - decentralised implementation with
centralised service support
This option has separate, decentralised implementing organisations for mine
actions services, with a central organisation providing support services including
recruiting, training and equipment.

Advantages
•

This option has many of the advantages of Option One, in that includes the
same separation of responsibilities between regulator/coordinator and
implementers.

•

It has a potential additional advantage in that it provides a central body for the
provision of support services, which could provide greater economies of scale
than having each implementer provide these services separately

Disadvantages
•

It is not yet proven that centralised service provision would actually be more
cost-effective.

•

Implementers using central services would still be responsible for meeting
standards, so may feel it necessary to introduce parallel structures in order to
ensure that they can meet contractual obligations.

•

It might be difficult to design the service provider to ensure that services were
provided in such a way as to meet donor preferences, especially if staff were
still considered as government employees.

•

It would not meet the requirements of many donors unless there is an
opportunity for NGOs to recruit staff directly

Recommendation: that Option One be adopted as the model for implementation
arrangements
Option One is recommended as it has the greatest potential to attract donor funds
and realise the ten-year plan. If option 1 is not possible to implement,
consideration should be given to the second option, noting that progress will be
severely limited unless there is flexibility for donors and NGOs to recruit staff
directly.
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Option Two

Government
of Lao

decentralised implementation with centralised service support

Steering Committee

Note: the actual number of
implementation
organisations may vary

Coordination
Body

Supplier:
logistics
personnel
training
Boxes with heavy
borders represent
the sustainable
element of the
program

Implementing
organisation

Implementing
organisation

Implementing
organisation

Implementing
organisation

Implementing
organisation

Some implementing
organisations may contract
their own staff directly

Each implementing organisation would be responsible
for developing the element of the project that would be
sustainable after the end of international funding

Figure 6/2. Outline organisation chart for Option Two
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Annex D Section 6: Developing partnerships in service provision
As stated above, it seems necessary to separate the functions of planning,
regulation and coordination from those of implementing identifying options for
structural change in the UXO sector in Lao PDR.
For an implementing organisation to be effective in such a system it will need to
have sufficient ability to gather the resources to meet its targets. This requires
some autonomy (over centralisation of decision making in the current UXO
structure was a recurrent theme among many stakeholders) but this does not
necessarily mean total independence. Indeed, both of the options set out above
rely on the provision of strategic guidance from the coordination body.
Similarly, because in the past within UXO LAO the term ‘implementing partners’
refers to foreign organisations (predominantly NGOs) it is easy to assume that
these options refer to ‘foreign’ implementation. Again, this is not necessarily the
case.
The diagram below at Figure 6/3 outlines the essential partnership approach that
is recommended.
In this structure, the first step is the establishment of a relationship between a
prospective donor and the Government of Lao, represented in this case by the
Coordination Body. UNDP could be a valuable broker in this process. Between
them they establish the modality by which the donor could support the program;,
for example, the donor can select a project or an element of the program from the
strategic action plan that fits in with the donor’s own funding strategies.
The second step is for the donor and the coordination body to select an
international NGO (or indeed a commercial service provider) to assist in the
implementation of the selected project35. The NGO has a contract with the donor
(perhaps via the UNDP Trust Fund) that provides an essential risk management
strategy for the donor, as the NGO is then contractually obliged to meet the
objectives of the contract. However, there is also a second element of control on
the NGO, which is the MOU or licence issued to the NGO by the Coordination
Body that sets out the relationship of the NGO to the Coordinating Body in terms
of prioritisation of work, reporting and quality standards. There is a third
requirement which is for the Coordination Body to undertake to provide whichever
support and guidance is necessary for the NGO to undertake and complete its
mission. Again, there is a valuable role for UNDP to play to help ensure that the
terms of the MOU are compatible with the terms of the Contract.

35

As an aside here, there is no reason why the selection of implementing NGO/service provider
cannot be done competitively. The use of a contracting process will ensure that all necessary
standards can still be met and it may mean increased cost effectiveness for the program as a
whole. At the very least it is compatible with the notion of increased transparency throughout the
program. It is also felt that the principle of having a number of different NGO/service providers is
valuable and every effort should be undertaken to ensure that a monopoly situation does not
develop. Furthermore, there is no technical reason why other potential service providers outside
the existing group of NGO/service providers cannot be included in the selection process.
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Once the NGO/service provider has its contract and MOU, it can then work with
the Coordination Body to select a Project Manager who is a Lao national. This
process is important as it helps ensure that this approach adds to genuine
capacity building in terms of project management. The NGO/service provider can
then work together on a collaborative process to select the individuals who are to
provide the technical assistance to the project36.
Once the project management team are established, they can then themselves
work on building the rest of the project unit structure.
This approach provides a balance between securing donor interest in terms of
financial accountability and transparency and developing strategic project
management capacity amongst the Lao nationals working on the project. This is
vital, not only to meet the valid Government of Lao concerns that the UXO
program must not pose a threat to security, but to ensure that, at a point where the
overall exit strategy for international involvement means that the project is entirely
in Lao hands, the implementing units have the capacity to run themselves.

36

The number of technical advisors and type of technical assistance they provide can vary with the
nature of the project and the stage the project reaches on its lifecycle. For example, it is reasonable
to expect more technical assistance at a training stage, with a greatly reduced level once the
training is complete and only monitoring is required.
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Project Unit
Donors

$

UNDP

$

$

Coordination
Body

$

MOU/Licence

NGO

$

Lao Project
Manager

Technical
Assistance
Note: the team composition
may vary

Boxes with heavy
borders represent
the sustainable
element of the
program

Team

Team

Team

Implementing Organisation Project Unit

Figure 6/3. Outline organisation chart for implementing organisation structure
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UNDP assistance to UXO coordination body in Lao PDR: Logical Framework
Overall
Objective
Project
Purpose
Intermediate
Results
Activities

Intervention Logic

Objectively Verifiable Indicators

Reduce the impact of UXO contamination in Lao
PDR by:
(1) Reducing casualties
(2) Clearing land for development
To provide strategic assistance to the UXO
coordination body in Lao PDR
Inception plan for coordination body developed
Coordination body established
Strategic action plan developed
Provision of strategic advice to Government of
Lao
Provision of technical assistance to coordinating
body on regulatory functions
Assistance with the development of technical
standards
Assistance with the development of strategic
action plans and prioritisation mechanisms

•
•
•

Socio economic impact reduced
Casualty numbers reduced
Priority land cleared and being used

Development
organisation
reports

•
•
•
•
•
•

Assistance provided
Coordination body functional
Inception plan circulated
Government of Lao authorisation
Plan circulated
Advice provided

Internal quality
processes

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Assistance with coordination

•
•
•

Technical assistance provided
Regulatory framework developed
Assistance provided
Technical standards produced
Assistance provided
Strategic action plan produced
Objective and transparent prioritisation
mechanism in place
Assistance provided
Coordination effective
Quality management system in place in
line with general principles of ISO 9000
Public information prepared, disseminated
and updated
Database developed to include detailed
records of all cleared areas
Trust Fund managed to UNDP standards
Independent program monitoring function
operational
Assistance provided

Assistance with development and
implementation of a quality framework
Assistance with preparation and dissemination
of public information material
Assistance with developing a national UXO
database
Managing the Lao UXO Trust Fund, including
independent program monitoring function on
behalf of donors
Assisting donors

•
•
•
•
•
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Annual progress
reports
External
validation
International
Mine Action
Standards
ISO 9000
UNDP
Guidelines on
Management of
Trust Funds
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Restructuring
concepts for
UXO Program
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UNDP project
proposal
accepted by
Government of
Lao
UNDP project
proposal
accepted by
donors and
funding made
available

Assessment mission of the Lao UXO Trust Fund and the UXO LAO Mine Action Programme

xxvi

DRAFT

